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ARBITRARY EXCLUSIONS OF "UNDESIRABLE" RACETRACK
AND CASINO PATRONS: THE COURTS' ILLUSORY
PERCEPTION OF COMMON LAW PUBLIC/PRIVATE
DISTINCTIONS
INTRODUCTION

At common law, proprietors of privately owned places of entertainment and amusement were not obligated to serve the gen-

eral public." A distinction was made between the duties of people
engaged in a "public calling,"' 2 and those who operated private enterprises. While the former had a duty to admit patrons indiscrim-

inately to their premises, the latter possessed a virtually limitless
1. See, e.g., Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U.S. 633 (1913) (patron excluded
from racetrack); Capital Theatre Co. v. Compton, 246 Ky. 130, 54 S.W.2d 620 (1932) (theatre); Greenfeld v. Maryland Jockey Club, 190 Md. 96, 57 A.2d 335 (1948) (racetrack); Foster
v. Shubert Holding Co., 316 Mass. 470, 55 N.E.2d 772 (1944) (theatre); Meisner v. Detroit,
B.I. & W. Ferry Co., 154 Mich. 545, 118 N.W. 14 (1908) (ferry boat not considered a common carrier); Woollcott v. Shubert, 217 N.Y. 212, 111 N.E. 829 (1916) (theatre); Madden v.
Queens County Jockey Club, 296 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d 697, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947)
(racetrack); Buenle v. Newport Amusement Ass'n, 29 R.I. 23, 68 A. 721 (1908) (dance hall);
Boswell v. Barnum & Bailey, 135 Tenn. 35, 185 S.W. 692 (1916) (circus); Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d
1165 (1948).
2. "[T]he law of public calling originated between 1300 and 1400 because of the monopolistic and oppressive conditions of business and trade at the time of the Black Death [in
England]." Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 411,
420 n.32 (1927). The early test of a public calling was set forth by Professor Wyman:
Those in a public calling have always been under the extraordinary duty to serve
all comers, while those in private business may always refuse to sell if they
please. So great a distinction as this constitutes a difference in kind of legal
control rather than merely one of degree. The causes of this division are, of
course, rather economic than strictly legal; and the relative importance of these
two classes at any given time, therefore, depends ultimately upon the industrial
conditions which prevail at that period. Thus in the England which we see
through the medium of our earliest law reports, the medieval system of established monopolies called for legal requirements of indiscriminate service from
those engaged in almost all employments. There followed in succeeding centuries
an expansion of trade which gradually did away with the necessity for coercive
law.
Id. at 424 n.46 (quoting 1 B. WYMAN, PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONs 2 (1911)). See also
Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution to the Trust Problem, 17 HARv. L.
REv. 156 (1904) (public calling described and distinguished from private enterprises). Innkeepers and common carriers typify proprietors engaged in a business with a public calling.
Madden, 296 N.Y. at 253, 72 N.E.2d at 698.
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right to exclude customers arbitrarily. 3 Such distinctions were
based upon the notion that places of amusement were not clothed
with a "public interest ' 4 and, therefore, proprietors were not required to accommodate everyone.
Racetrack proprietors additionally enjoyed an undisputed
right to exclude patrons indiscriminately from their premises at
common law, 5 so long as race, creed or color were not determinant
factors. 6 These businessmen were neither engaged in a public calling, nor were they held to be clothed with a public interest:
There is ... nothing inherent in the nature of horse racing which makes
operation of a race track the performance of a public function .
[R]ace tracks may well be affected with a public interest sufficient to
[..
justify governmental licensing or other regulation. Recognition of a public interest, however, is neither recognition nor acknowledgement that the State is
a partner in the business of horse racing ....

Since amusement places were considered private enterprises,8 the
common law did not confer upon the general public the right to

demand admission to such sites. e Accordingly, patrons were afforded limited redress for actions arising out of unjustified and arbitrary exclusions from racetracks. Their only remedy was a claim
for possible breach of contract. 10
As the gambling industry in general became more closely regu3. Madden, 296 N.Y. at 253, 72 N.E.2d at 698.
4. See id. at 255-56, 72 N.E.2d at 699. The distinction between licensees and franchise
owners was one standard used to ascertain which individuals held enterprises clothed with a
public interest. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
5. See Madden, 296 N.Y. at 249, 72 N.E.2d at 697; Marrone, 227 U.S. at 633; Greenfeld, 190 Md. 96, 57 A.2d 335 (1948); Garifine v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club, 29 N.J. 47,
148 A.2d 1 (1959). For jurisdictions still governed by the common law right to exclude patrons, see Tropical Park, Inc. v. Jock, 374 So. 2d 639 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (exclusion
from racetrack), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 1980); Nation v. Apache Greyhound
Park, 119 Ariz. 76, 579 P.2d 580 (1978) (dog racetrack).
6. Racetrack proprietors exercising a common law right to exclude patrons from racetracks could not contravene civil rights statutes. See Grannan v. Westchester Racing Ass'n,
153 N.Y. 449, 47 N.E. 896 (1897). A racetrack operator has "the power tii admit as spectators only those whom he may select, and to exclude others solely of his own volition, as long
as the exclusion is not founded on race, creed, color or national origin." Madden, 296 N.Y.
at 253, 72 N.E.2d at 698.
7. Madden, 296 N.Y. at 255-56, 72 N.E.2d at 699.
8. Id. at 254, 72 N.E.2d at 699.
9. But see infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
10. Such instances would occur with the purchase of any admission ticket. See infra
section I(B).
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lated, several state legislatures"' enacted statutes which changed
the common law right to exclude patrons. Many state courts, however, have interpreted these statutes as mere codifications of the
common law right.1 2 This interpretation enabled proprietors to retain the right to exclude patrons arbitrarily by maintaining that
gambling enterprises are private in nature. Recently, however,
courts have construed such statutes to mean that these rights
should be abrogated. 13 In Uston v. Resorts InternationalHotel,
Inc.,' 4 the New Jersey Supreme Court weighed a casino patron's
right to admission against a proprietor's right to exclusion. The
court held for the patron, thus obscuring the public/private distinction. The court lifted an injunction barring casino blackjack
"system players,"' 5 and stated that "the common law right to excommon law right of
clude is substantially limited by a competing
'6
reasonable access to public places.'
The need for statutory regulation of gaming establishments
stems from the recognition that the gambling industry has both
positive' 7 and negative'" aspects which integrally concern the pub11. See generally infra section H.
12. See, e.g., infra notes 76, 95-97 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 116-27 and accompanying text.
14. 89 N.J. 163, 445 A.2d 370 (1982). For a detailed discussion of Uston, see infra notes
139-47 and accompanying text. For a case study of Uston, see Note, New Jersey's Casino
Control Act and a Casino Patron'sRight of Reasonable Access Prevent Casinos from Excluding Card Counters, 28 VILL. L. REv. 451 (1983).
15. Casino blackjack system players are people who "keep track of the content of the
deck [of cards] and vary their bet size and playing strategy accordingly." K. USTON, MILLION
DOLLAR BLACKJACK 6 (1981). For a further discussion of system players, see E. THORP, BEAT
THE DEALER: A WINNING STRATEGY FOR THE GAME OF TwENTy-ONE (1966). See also infra
notes 136-47.
Kenneth Uston, a professional system player and the plaintiff in Uston, has been excluded from Nevada and Atlantic City, New Jersey casinos on several occasions. As a result,
he became adept at self-disguise in order to penetrate the blackjack tables. When Uston
initially was excluded in 1978 from Resorts International, an Atlantic City casino, Joseph P.
Lordi, chairman of the New Jersey Casino Control Commission at the time, commented that
Resorts was "free to develop its own standards." N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1979, at B2, col. 1.
Uston offered a different interpretation: "Basically, it means [the casinos] reserve the right
to exclude winners." Id.
16. Uston, 89 N.J. at 168, 445 A.2d at 372.
17. The gambling industry is an important revenue-raising device for participating
states. In 1977, $819,201,638 in revenue was generated by the states where greyhound racing
and horse racing are permitted. NATIONAL AsS'N OF STATE RACING COMM'RS, PARI-MUuEL
RACING 23 (1977). In 1980, New York State racetracks generated $256 million for state and
local governments. JOINT LEGISLATE TASK FORCE TO STUDY & EWALUATE THE PARI-MUTUEL
RACING INDUS. IN N.Y., THE RACING INDUSTRY INNEW YORK STATE 2 (1981). For an example
of the economic and social benefits of casino gambling, see infra note 174.
18. Direct correlations have been drawn between gambling and the corruptive elements
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lic. Certain statutes contain an explicit legislative acknowledgment
that these entities serve a vital public service.19 Most of these statutes also contain fundamentally similar features,2 21 0 yet have been
subject to varying interpretations by the courts.
The purpose of this Comment is to focus upon the contrasting
levels of discretion that state legislatures afford racetrack and casino licensees 22 to exclude patrons, and to examine judicial treatment of such legislative grants. While the statutory enactments
safeguard society from "corruptive elements, 23 they invite arbitrary exclusions. These statutes contain discriminatory features
and arguably are constitutionally "void for vagueness. '2 4 A tension
thus emerges between a policy to maintain public confidence in the

gambling industry through strict regulation,25 and the threat of
possible constitutional infringements. This Comment suggests that

racetrack and casino proprietors should be held to a public calling
standard in an effort to strike a better balance between these countervailing notions. The racetrack and casino industries are distinguishable from other places of amusement, since states are more
heavily dependent upon the revenue that the former entities genit attracts in society. For example, there has been a steady escalation of criminal activity in
Atlantic City, New Jersey, since casino gambling was legalized in 1976. There were 4,391
criminal incidents reported in 1977; 5,738 in 1978; 7,010 in 1979; and 11,899 in 1980. R.
ABRAMS, REPORT OF TE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN OPPOSITION TO LEGALIZED GAMBLING IN NEw
YORK STATE 3 (1981).

19. See, e.g., infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
20. Generally, these statutes offer broad discretion to racetrack proprietors to exclude
"undesirables" from the track. See generally infra text accompanying notes 75-127.
21. Compare Burrifiville Racing Ass'n v. Garabedian, 113 R.I. 134, 318 A.2d 469 (1974)
(common law right to exclude patrons was abrogated by statute) with Apache Greyhound
Park, 119 Ariz. at 76, 579 P.2d at 580 (plaintiff incorrectly relied upon Garabediansince the
Rhode Island statute merely codified the common law right to exclude).
22. For a definition of license, see infra note 42. It is the racetrack security personnel,
rather than the owner, who exclude patrons. COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF THE NAT'L POLicy TowARD GAMBLING, GAMBLING IN AMERICA 124 (1976) [hereinafter GAMBLING IN
AMERICA]. For the purposes of this Comment, however, the discretion of the owners to exclude patrons will be discussed, since they ultimately are responsible for the actions of the
guards.
23. See infra text accompanying note 106.
24. See infra section III(B).
25. See, e.g., the Nevada Gaming Control Act, which states in relevant part: "Public
confidence and trust can only be maintained by strict regulation of all persons, locations,
practices, associations and activities related to the operation of licensed gaming establishments. . . ." NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.0129(1)(c) (1979).
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erate,28 and thus require greater state involvement and regulation.
Accordingly, proprietors of these gambling enterprises should be
held to a higher standard of care to the general public than should
the "ordinary" proprietor of an amusement place.27 As already
mentioned, the Uston court held that casino gambling establishments should be held to a public standard.28 Proprietors of such
enterprises, therefore, "have a duty not to act in an arbitrary or
discriminatory manner toward persons who come on their
'29
premises.

This Comment also determines that statutory provisions
which allow for the exclusion of "undesirable" people s are overbroad and potentially may be used to exclude individuals who pose
no threat to the integrity of the gambling industry. This is evidenced by the exclusion in Uston, where the plaintiff was excluded
merely because he consistently won money. The Uston court, perhaps foreseeing the danger of an expansive statutory interpretation, held that system players could only be excluded if the statute
specifically provides for their exclusion.31 Similarly, the language in
most racetrack statutes is vague and potentially allows proprietors
to expand the meaning of "undesirables" to unworkable proportions. In an attempt to avert such possibilities, this Comment proposes specific statutory reforms and remedies.
I.

COMMON LAW RIGHT TO EXCLUDE PATRONS

The distinction between public and private establishments
was maintained at common law as a mechanism to dictate public
policy. Proprietors of amusement places were afforded a great deal
of discretion to exclude individuals because it was felt that the
formers' interests "outweigh[ed] the comparatively slight interests
of ...

[their] patrons." 2 The distinction was justified by the fact

that proprietors of amusement places were mere licensees33 of the
26. See supra note 17.
27. Gambling enterprises are more heavily regulated than, for example, amusement
parks and theatres.
28. See supra text accompanying note 14.
29. Uston, 89 N.J. at 173, 445 A.2d at 375.
30. See generally infra text accompanying notes 116-27.
31. Uston, 89 N.J. at 175, 445 A.2d at 376.
32. Garifine, 29 N.J. at 55, 148 A.2d at 5.
33. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
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state and had no duty to "promote the public welfare.

3

4

This con-

ferred upon racetrack owners the right to exclude patrons arbitrarily, which correspondingly limited judicial relief for aggrieved
patrons.3 5
A. Policy Motivations for the Public/PrivateDistinction
The considerations motivating judicial restraint (with respect
to redressing claims made by excluded patrons) rest with the notion that proprietors of private enterprises should not bear heavy
burdens of proof, even if they act mistakenly. In Garifine v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club,"6 the plaintiff was denied admission to a
racetrack because "his general record and reputation warrant[ed]
his exclusion.

' 37

The court alluded to potential evidentiary proof

problems by stating:
[The racetrack] admittedly tended to attract many undesirables who could
freely roam about its premises, and it was well-advised to be on the lookout
for them and to bar them whenever possible. It would seem rather unwise to
deter its cautionary efforts by judicial rulings placing heavy evidential burdens upon it ...

if perchance it acted mistakenly ....

38

The Garifine court also pointed out that tort liability should not
be imposed on a proprietor in the event he excludes an individual
for a mistaken reason.3 9 This insulated racetrack owners from liability arising from their employees' decisions to exclude customers.
In Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club,4 ° the plaintiff had
been mistakenly identified as a bookmaker and was denied injunctive relief against exclusion from a track; mere recognition of a
public interest did not give rise to a viable civil claim. Racetrack
proprietors retained "an absolute power to serve whom they
'42
pleased.

'41

These businessmen were considered mere "licensees,

34. At common law, a proprietor had a duty to "promote the public welfare" if he was
granted a state-created franchise. Madden, 296 N.Y. at 255, 72 N.E.2d at 699. See infra
note 43 (discussion of the privileges and obligations attached to a conferred franchise).
35. But see infra section l(B) (discussion of contractual remedies at common law).
36. 29 N.J. 47, 148 A.2d 1 (1959).
37. Id. at 49, 148 A.2d at 2.
38. Id. at 54-55, 148 A.2d at 5. The Garifine court was discussing policy issues in reference to the decision in Marrone, 277 U.S. at 633.
39. Garifine, 29 N.J. at 55, 148 A.2d at 5.
40. 296 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d 697, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).

41. Id. at 253, 72 N.E.2d at 698.
42. The Madden court defined license as

1983]

EXCLUDING "UNDESIRABLES"

with no obligation to serve the general public. They were not
granted franchises43 by the state to perform a public purpose.
The common law did not distinguish between a proprietor's
right to deny individuals entrance to his property and his right to
eject forcibly" those who already had gained access to his premises.45 The doctrine allowed the proprietor "to act 'for a bad reason

or no reason at all.'"48 In Greenfeld v. Maryland Jockey Club,47 a
racetrack proprietor refused to give "any just or lawful reason for
ejecting" the appellant, and asserted his "right to so eject any patron at [his] pleasure 'without any cause or reason whatsoever.' ",48
Although the court conceded that the racetrack serves a "'public
or quasi public function in which the State participates directly,' ,49 it still maintained that the appellant was protected from
arbitrary exclusion.
The proprietor's right to eject patrons forcibly is based upon
the consideration that proprietors will act with "decent caution,"50
and that the courts generally are unable to determine correctly
whether or not a proprietor acted "reasonably" and in "good
faith. 51 Justice Holmes, usually solicitous of citizens' rights, 2 felt
it was wiser to promulgate an unpopular law than to submit to
unreliable jury decisions:
no more than a permission to exercise a pre-existing right or privilege which has
been subjected to regulation in the interest of public welfare. The grant of a
license to promote the public good, in and of itself, however,. . . neither renders
the enterprise public nor places the licensee under obligation to the public.
Id. at 255, 72 N.E.2d at 699.
43. The Madden court defined franchise as
a special privilege, conferred by the State on an individual, which does not belong to the individual as a matter of common right.... It creates a privilege
where none existed before, its primary object being to promote the public welfare.... A familiar illustration is the right to use the public streets for the
purpose of maintaining and operating railroads, waterworks and electric light,
gas and power lines.
Id. (citations omitted).
44. See infra note 65 (distinction between exclusion and forcible ejection).
45. Greenfeld v. Maryland Jockey Club, 190 Md. 96, 57 A.2d 335 (1948).
46. See Conard, The Privilege of ForciblyEjecting An Amusement Patron, 90 U. PA.
L. REV. 809, 810 (1942).
47. 190 Md. 96, 57 A.2d 335 (1948).
48. Id. at 100, 57 A.2d at 336.
49. Id. at 99, 57 A.2d at 335.
50. Conard, supra note 46, at 820.
51. Id.
52. See id.
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[Justice Holmes] profoundly distrusted the jury. The rule that a proprietor
might eject a patron was probably one of the 'rules of law based on less than
universal considerations' which 'are made absolute and universal in order to
limit those over refined speculations that we all deprecate.' He observed as an
example of this principle, 'It is not thought worthwhile to let the right to
build or maintain a barn depend upon the speculations of a jury as to
motives'.53

The right to exclude patrons at common law perhaps can be
viewed as an attempt to establish predictable standards for order
and discipline in places of amusement. It has been argued that
such places invariably attract more "undesirable" patrons54 than a
public place would attract. The common law rule thus provides
proprietors with an effective weapon against these corruptive ele-

ments in society. It also eliminates a proprietor's burden of proving
that each allegedly aggrieved patron was an "undesirable." The establishment of a per se rule, however, poses an intrinsic danger to
patrons who may be ejected mistakenly. With some exceptions, 5 it
permits proprietors to eject patrons without the fear of judicial intervention. Uniform application of this rule minimized the importance that courts have attached to a case-by-case factual inquiry in
civil rights cases. 6 While proprietors were not always fully protected from liability arising from the forcible ejection of patrons,5
many erroneously ejected patrons ultimately were limited to an action in breach of contract.
53. Id. at 819-20 (quoting Leroy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Mil. & St. P. Ry., 232 U.S. 340,
353 (1914)) (Holmes, J., concurring) (emphasis original) (decision as to whether reasonable
care was exercised to protect property set on fire due to railroad employees' negligence not a
question for jury).
54. See generally infra text and accompanying notes 75-115 (conflicting interpretations
of the term "undesirable").
55.

See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
56. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (person denied service in restaurant successfully advanced a state action argument). "Owing to the very 'largeness' of government, a multitude of relationships might appear to some to fall within the
[Fourteenth] Amendment's embrace, but that, it must be remembered, can be determined
only in the framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances present." Id. at 725-26.
57. See Planchard v. Klaw & Erlanger New Orleans Theatre Co., 166 La. 235, 117 So.
132 (1928) (plaintiff recovered $500 for "insult and maltreatment" when theatre usher and
police officer forcibly excluded him). See also Conard, supra note 46, at 810-11.
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Proprietor/PatronContractualRelationship at Common Law

An admission ticket to a place of amusement generally was
considered a revocable license at common law.58 A ticket purchase
did not create an inherent contractual relationship between the
proprietor and patron. This allowed a proprietor to terminate the
contract at any time. The common law rule was adopted from an
English case, Wood v. Leadbitter,59 which held that a ticket
purchase did not create a right "in rem." 60 In Wood, the plaintiff
was removed from a racecourse without a refund of the admission
fee because of alleged past misdeeds. The court additionally denied
recovery in an action in assault and false imprisonment and held
that a proprietor may exclude without cause, despite the fact that
the patron had purchased a ticket. 1
In situations where a patron is excluded forcibly, American
courts have allowed for the refund of the price of an admission
ticket in breach of contract actions. In Marrone v. Washington
Jockey Club6 2 where a patron was prevented forcibly from entering the track premises for allegedly drugging a horse, the court
held:
A contract binds the person of the maker but does not create an interest in
the property that it may concern, unless it also operates as a conveyance. The
ticket was not a conveyance of an interest in the race track, not only because
it was not under seal but because by common understanding it did not pur-

port to have that effect."
While the courts generally held that the purported effect of a
ticket-contract does not create an interest in a place of amusement
for patrons, this did not free proprietors entirely from liability for
58. See Marrone, 227 U.S. at 633; Shubert v. Nixon Amusement Co., 83 N.J.L. 101, 83
A. 369 (1912); Woollcott v. Shubert, 217 N.Y. 212, 111 N.E. 829 (1916); Boswell v. Barnum
& Bailey, 135 Tenn. 35, 185 S.W. 692 (1916); Finnessey v. Seattle Baseball Club, 122 Wash.
276, 210 P. 679 (1922). But see Hurst v. Picture Theatres, [1915] 1 K.B. 1 (C.A.) (theatre
proprietor has no right to exclude patron who was behaving properly).
59. 13 M. & W. 838, 153 Eng. Rep. 351 (Ex. 1845). Wood was expressly overruled in
England by Hurst, 1 K.B. at 1.
60. In rem literally means "against the thing." "An 'action in rem' is a proceeding that
takes no cognizance of owner but determines the right in specific property against all of the
world, equally binding on everyone." Flesch v. Circle City Excavating & Rental Corp., 137
Ind. App. 695, 698, 210 N.E.2d 865, 868 (1965).
61. Wood, 13 M. & W. at 838, 153 Eng. Rep. at 351.
62. 227 U.S. 633 (1913).
63. Id. at 636.
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their torts.4 For example, the court in Boswell v. Barnum & Bailey"' stated that although a customer's ticket is a revocable license,
an action in tort could be maintained if excessive force and insulting language is used during his expulsion from the premises. Such
potential liability compelled owners to exercise reasonable discretion when ejecting individuals. In effect, then, the proprietor's
privilege at common law to eject people arbitrarily through the use
of excessive force or incivility was not absolute."' If the patron was
"improperly" ejected or excluded, the proprietor might be liable in
tort.
The racetrack owner's right to exclude patrons was also affected by existing relevant statutes.6 7 In Greenberg v. Western
5 the plaintiff, who published a daily racing
Turf Association,"
form, was denied access to the defendant's track on numerous occasions. The defendant racetrack proprietor appealed from a trial
court holding for the plaintiff, alleging the unconstitutionality of a
California statute." This statute made it unlawful to refuse admission to any place of amusement to anyone under twenty-one years
of age, unless such person was intoxicated, boisterous or of "lewd
or immoral character.

'7 0

The California Supreme Court affirmed

the trial court's judgment, finding that the statute was constitutional since it was within the state's police powers to regulate
places of amusement.7

1

The decision was affirmed by the United

States Supreme Court, where Justice Harlan stated:
It is neither an arbitrary exertion of the State's inherent or governmental
power, nor a violation of any right secured by the Constitution of the United
64.

But see supra text accompanying note 39.

65. 135 Tenn. 35, 185 S.W. 692 (1916). There is a distinction between the "ejection of a
patron," as in Boswell, and the "exclusion" of a patron. "Ejection is the act of removing a
person from the premises. Exclusion denies entrance." J. Hu'mpEYs, RACING LAW 207

(1963).
66. See Conard, supra note 46, at 823. Conard believes that the rule is not genuine
because "common sense asks whether proprietors actually put out customers in violation of
contract, and without even an honest belief of facts which would constitute good cause." Id.
at 810. However, numerous cases indicate that patrons have been forcibly ejected without
cause. See, e.g., Marrone, 227 U.S. at 633.
67. Many jurisdictions did not have statutes governing the exclusion of patrons from
places of amusement when the earlier exclusion cases arose. See generally cases cited supra
note 58.
68. 148 Cal. 126, 82 P. 684 (1905), aff'd 204 U.S. 359 (1907).
69. Id. at 127, 82 P. at 684.
70. Greenberg v. Western Turf Ass'n, 140 Cal. 357, 73 P. 1050 (1903).
71. Greenbergk148 Cal. at 128, 82 P. at 685.

1983]

EXCLUDING "UNDESIRABLES"

States. The race-course in question being held out as a place of public entertainment and amusement is, by the act of the defendant, so far affected
with a public interest that the State may, in the interest of good order and
fair dealing, require defendant to perform its engagement to the public, and
recognize its own tickets of admission in the hands of persons entitled to
claim the benefits of the statute. That such a regulation violates any right of
property secured by the Constitution of the United States cannot,
for a mo72
ment, be admitted. The case requires nothing further to be said.

The Greenberg holding ran contrary to the generally accepted
common law right to exclude individuals, and thus placed a limitation on the proprietor's powers. The patron's right against arbitrary exclusion outweighed the burden imposed upon the proprietor to prove that the patron was "undesirable." State statutes
similar to the California statute were drafted subsequent to Greenberg, yet they granted racetrack proprietors the sole discretion to
exclude "undesirable" patrons without cause.7 - These statutory enactments, therefore, ultimately were a restatement of the common
law74 and did not alter a racetrack owner's right to exclude patrons
arbitrary.
II.

STATUTORY ENACTMENTS: ABROGATION OR MERE CODIFICATION
OF THE COMMON LAW?

In several jurisdictions, state statutes have altered the level of
discretion afforded racetrack licensees to exclude people at common law.7s Various courts have interpreted such statutes as a restatement or codification of the common law doctrine. 6 Some
courts, however, have interpreted these laws as an abrogation of
the right to exclude patrons arbitrarily.7 7 This is evidenced not
72. Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 364 (1907).
73. For a discussion dealing with statutory enactments as a codification of the common
law, see infra notes 76-114 and accompanying text.
74. See id.
75. See generally infra section 11(B).
76. See, e.g., Nation v. Apache Greyhound Park, 119 Ariz. 76, 78, 579 P.2d 580, 582
(1978), where appellant relied upon a Rhode Island statute (see infra note 77 for statute)
purportedly requiring a showing that the patron was "undesirable." The court dispensed

with this argument, reasoning that the Rhode Island statute, affording discretion to the
"sole judgment of said licensee," was only a codification of the common law. 119 Ariz. at 76,
579 P.2d at 582.
77. See, e.g., Narragansett Racing Ass'n v. Mazzaro, 116 R.L 1354, 357 A.2d 442 (1976).
Mazzaro held that a patron was protected statutorily from arbitrary exclusion. A showing of
good cause, in addition to a showing that the patron was "undesirable," is required for the
racetrack to exclude a patron permanently. The Mazzaro decision was a restatement of the
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only in cases dealing with exclusions from racetracks, but also in
cases which place limitations on a licensee's right to deny certain
patrons access to gambling casinos. In Uston v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc.,75 for example, the court expressly held that casinos are public places and that proprietors have a duty not to exclude people arbitrarily. The existing dilemma, then, is that most
state statutes express strikingly similar language, yet are subject to
differing jurisdictional interpretations.
A.

Statutory Treatment of "Undesirable" People
The fact that "[u]ndesirable persons who have entered gam-

bling and given it a bad name can be forced out"7 has been ad-

vanced as a positive aspect of legalized gambling.80 The reasoning
follows that legalized gambling establishments can serve as a disincentive to the formation of illegal operations. While such criminal
behavior can be curtailed through strict regulations,81 problems
arise in determining who falls within the definition of "undesirable," and in deciding how the activities of the "undesirables"
should be regulated.
It is generally accepted that the state has an interest in excluding certain classes of individuals from racetracks which pose a
criminal and/or monetary threat to the horse racing industry 82among these classes are bookmakers and race-fixers. Difficulties
arise, however, when individuals do not fall within a distinct classification, and proprietors are afforded by statute unlimited discretion to exclude them. A balance between the state's interests and
those of excluded individuals must be analyzed, therefore, in an
effort to deal with exclusion cases which lie within the penumbra.
holding in Garabedian,113 R.I. at 134, 318 A.2d at 469, but added that the statute was a
clear abrogation of the common law right to exclude. The Rhode Island statute states:
Ejection of undesirable persons-Rights of licensee. Any licensee hereunder
shall have the right to refuse admission to and eject from the enclosure of any
pari-mutuel facility where a pari-mutuel meeting. . . is being held, any person
or persons whose presence within said enclosure is, in the sole judgment of said
licensee, its agents or servants, undersirable [sic].
R.I. GEN. LAws § 41-3-17 (1969).
78. 89 N.J. 163, 445 A.2d 370 (1982).
79.
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(1973).
80. Id.
81. See supra note 25.
82. See supra notes 17-18.
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If racetrack proprietors had to prove that every excluded person
would actually engage in some unlawful activity had the latter not
been excluded, they would constantly face frivolous lawsuits.8 3 On
the other hand, statutory interpretations favoring unlimited discretion to exclude people could give rise to potential constitutional
violations."
1. Excluded racetrack bookmakers. The state has a monetary interest in barring bookmakers 5 from racetracks. When a
bookmaker places an illegal bet for an individual, in essence he is
channelling away revenue that would have been received by a racetrack, and is reducing the likelihood that winnings will be reported
for income tax purposes. Since the state retains a taxable portion
of racetrack revenue,88 the money it derives from this revenue is
7
diminished significantly by extensive bookmaking activity.
The New York Court of Appeals dealt with the exclusion of a
convicted bookmaker in People v. Licata.8 In Licata, the defendant received written notice "'not to enter or remain at any time'
upon the premises of the track,"89 yet he tried to gain entry four
months later. Judge Jasen upheld a conviction for criminal tres83. Apache Greyhound Park, 119 Ariz. at 78, 579 P.2d at 582.
84. See infra section IlL
85. The notion of bookmaking emerged sometime around the year 1800. The bookmaker was "dedicated to the proposition that a majority of other gamblers more likely than
not will lose." R. SAsULY, BooKEs & BETroRs 14 (1982). He would accept bets illegally from
those in the general public on horse races:
On one side stood the backer, the person who liked the chances of a horse well
enough to register his opinion with a bet. Facing him was the bookmaker (or
blackleg, or simply leg), clearly not a gentleman, who laid his money against the
horse's chances. The backer, who wagered that a horse would win, stood in the
ancient tradition, backing his opinion about the speed of the horse. The bookmaker acted on a new concept: he made his own judgment, not merely about the
horse but also about the worth of the bettor's opinion. In addition, he offered
different odds on the chances of different horses. He thus tempted a backer to
wager on a lightly regarded horse, and, at the same time, the varying odds made
it possible for the bookmaker to make a profit (given enough bettors or, as would
be said today, enough action) no matter which horse won.
Id. at 15 (parentheticals original).
86. See supra note 17.
87. Bookmakers comprise a major portion of people excluded from racetracks. The
fifty-five member tracks of the Thoroughbred Racing Association excluded 1661 patrons for
illicit bookmaking activities between November 1973 and August 1974. GAMBLING IN
AMERICA, supra note 22, app. 3, at 133.
88. 28 N.Y.2d 113, 268 N.E.2d 787, 320 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1971).
89. Id. at 114, 268 N.E.2d at 788, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
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pass,9 0 based upon a regulation barring "undesirables."9 1 The regulation imposed a burden upon licensees to screen people at the

racetrack carefully.2

The defendant argued that his ticket

purchase created a binding contract and thus nullified the existing

exclusion order. The court, however, held that this view weighed
heavily against policy considerations and would prevent effective
enforcement of regulations.'
An additional policy concern deals with the question of
whether a banned patron, convicted of bookmaking several years
earlier, can assert that his exclusion was based upon a "stale
claim."9 4 In Epstein v. California Horse Racing Board,"' the Cali-

fornia District Court of Appeal denied an individual permission to
90. Criminal trespass in the third degree, a violation, was amended to read merely
"Trespass" in 1971, apparently to reinforce the noncriminal nature of the offense; the text
of the statute remained the same. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.05 Practice Commentary (McKinney 1975). Section 140.05 reads: "Trespass. A person is guilty of trespass when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises." Section 140.00(5) states:" A person
'enters or remains unlawfully' in or upon premises when he is not licensed or privileged to
do so."
91. N.Y. ADMiN. CODE tit. 9, § 4003.46 (1983) states:
Undesirable persons to be ejected. No person who is known or reputed to be a
bookmaker or a vagrant within the meaning of the statutes of the State of New
York, or a fugitive from justice, or whose conduct at a racetrack in New York or
elsewhere, is or has been improper, obnoxious, unbecoming or detrimental to the
best interests of racing, shall enter or remain upon the premises.
92. Licata, 28 N.Y.2d at 115, 268 N.E.2d at 788, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
93. Id. at 116-17, 268 N.E.2d at 789, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 56. Judge Jason stated that:
Relevant policy considerations would also seem to weigh heavily in the result we
reach. The State Racing Commission regulation is explicit that 'No person who
is known or reputed to be a bookmaker ... shall enter ... upon the premises
of any licensed ... race meeting' (emphasis added). To hold that the sale of a
ticket revokes an existing lawful order 'not to enter,' would prevent effective
enforcement of the commission's regulation barring certain undesirable persons
from racetracks. Under such an interpretation, an undesirable person would
never be subject to criminal prosecution for violating the 'not to enter' order, but
would merely risk expulsion from the racetrack upon discovery on the premises.
This, in our view, would place an unreasonable burden upon the track officials in
enforcing a reasonable and desirable policy of our State.
Id. (citation omitted) (parenthetical original).
94. A stale claim is a demand that
has long remained unasserted, one that is first asserted after an unexplained
delay which is so long as to render it difficult or impossible for the court to
ascertain the truth of the matters in controversy and do justice between the
parties, or as to create a presumption against the existence or validity of the
claim, or a presumption that the claim has been abandoned or satisfied.
Luschen v. Stanton, 192 Okla. 454, 459, 137 P.2d 567, 572 (1943).
95. 222 Cal. App. 2d 831, 35 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1963).
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engage in pari-mutuel wagering, 98 based upon a twenty-four year
old bookmaking conviction.9 7 In reversing a superior court decision, the court found that the California Racing Board did not

abuse its discretion by excluding the patron.9 8 Although the connection between his conviction and exclusion appeared to be atten-

uated by a significant time span, the court considered other factors
in its determination-the patron was arrested for "past posting"99
in 1950, was "laying off" money 0 0 thereafter, made hundreds of
recent telephone calls to reputed gamblers, and was evasive when
questioned at the board's hearing. 101
The exclusion of "improper or objectionable persons" was held
to be consistent with public policy interests in a Louisiana case
where the court denied a convicted bookmaker access to a racetrack.10 2 Although this statutory language appears to be vague and
overbroad, the term "improper and objectionable" has "acquired a
definite and recognized meaning . . . [which includes] a person
who has been convicted of bookmaking."'10 3 The court noted that
96. "The essence of the pari-mutuel system of betting is that bettors wager against one

another instead of against a bookmaker."

GAMBLING IN AMERICA,

supra note 22, at 107. The

majority of pari-mutuel wagering is conducted at dog and horse racetracks. Id. at 105.
97. CAL.Bus. & PROF. CODE § 19572 (West 1964) states: Exclusion from tracks of undesirable persons: regulation "The board may ... [exclude] any known bookmaker, . .. or
any other person whose presence in the inclosure would, in the opinion of the board, be
inimical to the interests of the State or of legitimate horseracing, or both."
98. Epstein, 222 Cal. App. 2d at 845, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 651. There must be a "clear abuse
of discretion" to contradict a finding of the board. Id. at 855, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 651.
99. Past posting is a method of illegal wagering in which a person knows the result of a
race before placing a bet with a bookmaker. Id. at 842, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
100. When a bookmaker accepts "heavy" bets on a horse, he stands to lose a considerable amount of money if the horse wins. The bookmaker protects himself by laying off with a
man who performs an underwriter function. Id. at 842, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 649. The bookmaker
needs, among other things, "a means of rapid out-bound communication, usually the telephone, with other bookmakers or persons financing bookmakers, in order to balance his
book and protect against severe loss when the betting becomes heavy on any particular
entry. This hedging process is known as the laying off of bets." R. SASULY, supra note 85, at
123-24. This activity was commented upon in Flores v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 55 Cal.
2d 736, 361 P.2d 921, 13 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1961).
101. Epstein, 222 Cal. App. 2d at 842-45, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 649-51.
102. Bonamo v. Louisiana Downs, Inc., 337 So. 2d 553 (La. 1976) (patron excluded from
racetrack less than one year after his bookmaking conviction). Bonamo construed LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 4:172(d) (West 1973) ("[tlhe stewards shall order ejected from the grounds of
the association any improper or objectionable persons").
103. Id. at 559. The state of Florida has a similar statute, which states:
No person who is a bookmaker, or who is known or reputed to be a bookmaker,
or who is a vagrant within the meaning of the laws of Florida, or who is a fugi-
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bookmakers must be excluded "to successfully operate and to
maintain public confidence." 1 4 The state, however,
has an equally
10 5
compelling interest in regulating race-fixers.

2. Excluded race-fixers. In addition to the state's need to
raise revenue from the racing industry, there is a corresponding
need to maintain the integrity of the sport of horse racing. It is
established public policy that "the gaming industry [be] . . .free

from criminal and corruptive elements."10 To accomplish this
goal, it is essential that race-fixing activity be curtailed.
The problem of race-fixing was dealt with in Presti v. New
York Racing Association,0 7 where a broker who sold and purchased racehorses was excluded from a racetrack for allegedly conspiring to enter horses in races under the guise that they were
owned by other people. He argued that access to the track was
"critical" for him to conduct his business properly.108 An injunction against exclusion was granted at Special Term, which concluded that while there was "an obligation to exclude undesirables," this was "subject to review by the Courts, which may
10 9
determine whether [such exclusions] are arbitrary or capricious.
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court reversed, stating
that this inquiry is limited to the exclusion of licensed people, 110
such as an owner or trainer. Since the broker was not licensed, the
tive from justice, or whose conduct, on or off a racetrack or fronton premises
located in Florida or elsewhere, now or heretofore, has been improper, obnox.
ious, unbecoming or detrimental to the best interests of racing, shall enter or
remain upon the premises of any licensee.
FLA. STAT. § 7e-1.05 (15) (1983). See Mones v. Austin, 318 F. Supp. 653 (S.D. Fla. 1970)
(Florida statute barring convicted bookmakers from racetracks upheld as bearing reasonable
relationship to legitimate state objective and was not violative of equal protection clause);
see also Tropical Park v. Jock, 374 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1979) (a pari-mutuel owner's common
law right to exclude a patron because of his known underworld connections is not abrogated
by any Florida statute).
104. Bonamo, 337 So. 2d at 555-56.
105. A race-fixer is a person who enhances his chances that a particular horse will win a
race through illegal methods. For example, illegal injections of certain drugs into a horse will
help him run faster. For a discussion of race-fixing, see R. SASULY, supra note 85.
106. NEv. RE v. STAT. § 463.0129(1)(b).
107. 46 A.D.2d 387, 363 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1975). The Presti decision rests upon the holding
of Jacobson v. New York Racing Ass'n, Inc., 33 N.Y.2d 144, 305 N.E.2d 765, 350 N.Y.S.2d
639 (1973) (exclusion of horse owner and trainer).
108. Presti,46 A.D.2d at 388, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
109. Id. at 389-90, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 26-27.
110. Id. at 390, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
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racetrack proprietor justifiably exerted his common law right to
exclude patrons."'
In the New Jersey case of Bishop v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority,11 2 the court denied the plaintiff admission to
the Meadowlands Racetrack, based upon the individual's federal
conviction for race-fixing in Maryland. This activity was deemed to
be "conduct detrimental to racing or the public welfare"1 13 under
New Jersey regulations. While the regulations do not mention
criminal convictions specifically as grounds for exclusion," 4 the decision appears to be consistent with the policy to bar people engaged in criminal conduct relating to horse racing.
It is clear that strict regulatory standards must be imposed if
the racing industry is to be safeguarded from criminal influences,
such as race-fixing and bookmaking. Recent cases from several jurisdictions, 1 5 however, question whether proprietors of places of
amusement should retain unlimited discretion in determining
which of their patrons are "undesirable" people.
3. Abrogation of common law right to exclude. An inherent
contradiction is present in most of the statutory enactments mentioned above. While they seemingly limit arbitrary exclusion by requiring a finding that a patron is "undesirable," the courts grant
unlimited discretion to racetrack licensees in making such a finding. In the absence of specific guidelines characterizing "undesirable" people, most courts are reluctant to abrogate the common
law right of exclusion." 6
In Rhode Island, however, the state legislature changed the
common law right to exclude. 1 " The statute initially was interpreted by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in 1974 to require
"that a determination be made that the person to be ejected or
excluded is an undesirable person whose presence is inconsistent
111. Id.
112. 168 N.J. Super. 533, 403 A.2d 934 (1979).
113. Id. at 535, 403 A.2d at 935 (quoting N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13-70-1.17(a) (1980)).
114. Certain state statutes deem such convictions as grounds for exclusion. See, e.g.,
infra note 125.
115. See infra notes 116-27 and accompanying text.
116. See James v. Churchill Downs, Inc., 620 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (no
intent behind statute to abrogate proprietor's common law right to exclude an "undesirable"

from track).
117.

R.I. GEN. LAwS § 41-3-17 (1969). See supra note 77.
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with the orderly and proper conduct of the racing program."

18

Subsequently, the court interpreted the statute to require a showing of "good cause," in addition to a showing that the person was

"undesirable," for an individual to be excluded permanently. 119

Ironically, though, the Rhode Island statute closely resembles

those from other jurisdictions which do not abolish common law
exclusion.
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire also proscribed the
common law rule when it held in Tamelleo v. New Hampshire
Jockey Club, Inc.120 that denial of access for patrons could not be
"arbitrary." The New Hampshire statute granted "any licensee
. . . the right to refuse admission to . . . any person or persons
whose presence within said enclosure is in the sole judgment of

said licensee inconsistent with the orderly and proper conduct of a
race meeting."

'21

The court interpreted "'sole judgment' to mean

that the judgment cannot
be exercised in a capricious, arbitrary or
1' 22

unreasonable manner.
A conflict arises between the burden on racetrack owners to
screen "undesirables" (Licata),2 and the unlimited discretion to
exclude people at common law (Presti).24 This problem is evident
when examining, for example, the relevant New York regulations. 2 5 These regulations enumerate "undesirable" acts yet also
118. Garabedian,113 R.I. at 138, 318 A.2d at 472 (statute took the place of the common law rule, although patron's exclusion was upheld).
119. Mazzaro, 116 R.I. at 354, 357 A.2d at 442 (excluded patron allowed to enter racetrack premises). For a case prior to Mazzaro in which an individual was admitted to a racetrack (but with common law right to exclude remaining intact), see Burrillville Racing Ass'n
v. Mello, 107 R.I. 669, 270 A.2d 513 (1970). For a Pennsylvania case which recognized abrogation of the common law, see Rockwell v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Comm'n, 15
Pa. Commw. 348, 327 A.2d 211 (1974). However, the relevant statutory provisions were repealed by the Race Horse Industry Act, ch. 4, 1981 Pa. Laws 435, no. 135 § 401(b). It is,
therefore, presently unclear what the state of the law is.
120. 102 N.H. 547, 550, 163 A.2d 10, 13 (1960). The court, while disallowing arbitrary
exclusions, still upheld the common law right to exclude.
121. N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 284:39 (1977).
122. Tamelleo, 102 N.H. at 550, 163 A.2d at 13.
123. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
125. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 9, § 4119.8 (1974) states in relevant part:
Undesirable persons. Any person whether a licensee, participant or patron
whose conduct is deemed detrimental to the best interests of harness racing or
who is deemed an undesirable person may be expelled from the track.. . . Acts
deemed undesirable shall consist of, but not be limited by, the following:
(a) bookmaking or other illegal wagering or gambling;
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state that nothing diminishes the right to exclude a patron without
reason.1 26 While there appears to be a concern to discriminate only
against "undesirables," licensees are still afforded the right to ban
any patron arbitrarily. In essence, these regulations, while facially
purporting to abrogate this common law right to exclude people,
merely reiterate it.
The state's concern with ridding gambling of corruptive elements justifies strict regulation of the racing industry. However,
the governing statutes are overbroad and conceivably could extend
to the "ordinary" patron, who the statutes are designed to protect.
This possibility is further evidenced by cases which deal with the
12 7
"blacklisting" of certain individuals from casino establishments.
B. Blacklisting of Casino "Card Counters"
In the United States, legalized casino gambling exists only in
the state of Nevada12 8 and in Atlantic City, New Jersey.129 As is

the case with horse racing, each state has a commission which imposes strict standards upon proprietors seeking gambling licenses. 30 These commissions additionally possess the discretionary
power to exclude patrons from casinos by placing their names on a
blacklist.' 3 ' While it has been argued that such exclusionary lists
(b) touting [placing bets for others, while expecting compensation];

(c) creating or continuing a public disturbance;
(d) disorderly conduct;
(e) associating with undesirables; [and]
(f) transmitting information to points outside the track.

.. . In addition a person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or who has been convicted of bookmaking or other forms of illegal
gambling. . . shall be subject to expulsion as provided in this section. Nothing
contained in this section shall diminish the right of any track to exclude any
person as a patron or otherwise without reason provided such exclusion is not
based upon race, creed, color or national origin [emphasis added].
126. See id.
127. See infra section II(B).
128. See Nevada Gaming Control Act, NEv. REV. STAT. ch. 463 (1981).
129. See Casino Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN., ch. 12 (West Supp. 1983-1984).
130. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-12-84 to 86 (West Supp. 1983-1984) (licensing standards set
forth by the Casino Control Comm'n); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 463.170-.172 (1981) (licensing
standards governed by the Nevada Gaming Comm'n).
131. NEv. REv. STAT. § 463.151(3)-(4) (1981) allows state regulatory agencies to exclude
(blacklist) certain individuals from the casinos:
(3) In making that determination, the board and the commission may consider any:
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(a) Prior conviction of a crime which is a felony in this state or under
the laws of the United States, a crime involving moral turpitude or a violation of the gaming laws of any state;
(b) Violation or conspiracy to violate the provisions of this chapter relating to:
(1) The failure to disclose an interest in a gaming establishment for
which the person must obtain a license; or
(2) Willful evasion of fees or taxes;
(c) Notorious or unsavory reputation which would adversely affect public confidence and trust that the gaming industry is free from criminal or
corruptive elements; or
(d) Written order of a governmental agency which authorizes the exclusion or ejection of the person from an establishment at which gaming or
pari-mutuel wagering is conducted.
(4) Race, color, creed, national origin or ancestry, or sex must not be grounds
for placing the name of a person upon the list.
Nevada regulation, NEv. ADMIN. CODE § 28.010(3) (1980), defines a "notorious or unsavory
person" as someone who can be established through identification of his criminal activity
found in published federal and state legislative reports.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-71(a) (West Supp. 1983-1984) states that the Gambling Commission may provide, by regulation, for the exclusion of people:
(1) Who are career or professional offenders... ;
(2) Who have been convicted of a criminal offense under the laws of any state or
of the United States, which is punishable by more than 6 months in prison, or of
any crime or offense involving moral turpitude; or
(3) Whose presence in a licensed casino would, in the opinion of the commission,
be inimical to the interest of the State of New Jersey or of licensed gaming
therein, or both.
The first major challenge to casino blacklisting was made in Marshall v. Sawyer, 301
F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962), aff'd on other grounds, 365 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1006 (1967). The plaintiff, blacklisted for his criminal activity, was ejected forcibly
from a Las Vegas casino. He did not contest that he was an "undesirable," as defined by
Nevada regulations. He argued that the blacklisting procedure deprived him of the right to
be free from arbitrary and unreasonable classification as guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. 365 F.2d at 112. The court proceeded on "the assumption that the regulation is
valid" and that the plaintiff was not deprived of "any constitutionally-guaranteed right." Id.
at 113.
The most recent Nevada case concerning blacklisted casino patrons is Spilotro v. State,
Ex rel. Nev. Gaming Comm'n, 99 Nev. -,
661 P.2d 467 (Nev. 1983). In Spilotro, the
plaintiff was placed on a blacklist, although the Nevada Gaming Commission
did not make any findings of basic fact to support its ultimate findings that
Spilotro possessed a notorious and unsavory reputation, had been convicted of
crimes that would be felonies if committed in Nevada or under federal law, and
was a person whose presence in a licensed gambling establishment would be inimical to the interests of the State and the licensed gaming industry. Thus the
Commission made absolutely no attempt to comply with the dictates of NRS
463.312(18).
Id. at
, 661 P.2d at 469. While the court held that Nevada statutes authorizing a blacklist neither constituted a bill of attainder nor deprived Spilotro of any constitutional rights
(id. at -,
661 P.2d at 470, 471), the case clearly illustrates that patrons cannot be excluded arbitrarily from Nevada casinos.
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are "bills of attainder, 13 2 administrative and judicial relief are
available after exclusion. 13 3 In addition, most of the individuals
designated on these lists are associated with criminal activity.13
However, major policy questions arise when a patron is placed on a
blacklist for reasons other than his criminal involvement. Such is
the case with the blacklisting of professional card counters from
playing blackjack. 13 5
On the federal level, Uston v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 448 F. Supp. 116 (D. Nev. 1978), held
that the exclusion of a card counter did not give rise to a state action claim. Currently,
however, a similar constitutional challenge to the Nevada blacklisting statutes and regulations is pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Letter from John A. Godfrey, Deputy Att'y Gen., Nevada naming Div., to Perry Z. Binder (Dec. 10, 1982).
132. See Note, State Regulation of Casino Gambling: ConstitutionalLimitations and
FederalLabor Law Preemption, 49 FoRDHm L. REv. 1038, 1042-48 (1981). A bill of attainder is a legislative act which punishes people placed on a list without a judicial trial. Id. at
1042 & n.28; See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
133. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-71(f); NEv. REv. STAT. § 463.153(1).
134. Public policy concerns regarding corruptive elements have been clearly expressed.
See supra text accompanying note 106. See also Nav. REv. STAT. § 463.0129(1)(b) (it is a
stated policy objective to maintain public confidence and trust "that the gaming industry is
free from criminal and corruptive elements").
Currently, there are approximately sixty names on the New Jersey blacklist. Most of
these individuals were convicted in local court for cheating in a casino. Letter from Ben A.
Borowsky, Public Info. Off., Casino Control Comm'n, to Perry Z. Binder (Dec. 7, 1982). As
of 1980, Nevada had twelve individuals on its list, all for criminal activity in organized
crime. Oversight of Labor Dep't Investigation of Teamsters Central State Pension Fund:
Hearings before Perm. Subcomm. on Investigation of the Comm. on Governmental Aff.,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 173-87 (1980).
135. See Rose, The Legalization and Control of Casino Gambling, 8 FORDHAm Uri.
L.J. 245, 277 n.171 (1980). "Blackjack, also called 21, is a card game in which a player wins
if the total value of his hand is closer to 21 than the dealer's total." N.Y. Times, Feb. 1,
1979, at B2, col. 2. A professional card counter
determines whether the undealt part of the deck is rich in high cards. If so, he
knows that the chances are good that the dealer will draw a high card that will
make the dealer's hand go over 21 if he is drawing with a hand worth 16 or less.
Then the counter can "stand pat" even with a very low total.
Against a dealer's 17, for example, a counter "seeing" a deck of high cards
knows that he is likely to outscore the dealer if he is drawing to a total of no
more than 11. In either case, he might make the maximum bet allowed. If the
deck has few high cards, the counter might make the minimum bet.
Id.
Although Nevada regulations only allow for the blacklisting of recognized criminal
figures (supra note 131) approximately one-half of Nevada casinos employ the private services of the Griffin Detective Agency which maintains its own "Mug Book." See K. USTON,
MILLION DOLLAR BLACKJACK, supra note 15, at 263. The Mug Book (or "brown book") is a
dossier of cheaters and card counters. Id. Aside from these records, Griffin circulates fliers
to casinos if a card-counting team is detected. Id.
Kenneth Uston, the author of Million Dollar Blackjack and a professional card counter,
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An expert card counter is a person who can achieve a statistical advantage while playing blackjack. 136 This is accomplished by
rapidly calculating the shifting probabilities of winning a bet after
the card dealer exposes each card.13 7 A discussion of the blacklisting of casino card counters is germane to this Comment because it
provides a prime example of a proprietor's use of a gambling statute to exclude people who pose no criminal threat to the industry. 38' It is important to the analysis of what constitutes an "undesirable" person, and raises the issue of whether a person can be
denied access to a gaming establishment if he finds a way to legally
"beat the system."
The issue of blacklisting casino card counters arose in Uston v.
Resorts International Hotel, Inc.1 39 Kenneth Uston, a renowned
blackjack strategist, 140 was excluded from a casino after a new
commission rule dramatically increased card counters' odds of winning." 1 The court held that patrons have "a common law right of
argues that these private listings are illegal. Id. One of the constitutionally questionable
admonitions in the Mug Book to which he points is that "[n]o one is to be told that he is in
the Mug Book." Id. In addition, although a person cannot be asked to leave a casino solely
because his name appears in the Mug Book, the accused might never be certain of the reason for exclusion, since Nevada trespass law does not require that a reason be given for such
an exclusion. Id. at 264. Thus, since the book is secretly distributed, those accused of being
criminals or card counters are denied an opportunity to confront such charges.
136.

K. USTON, MILLION DOLLAR BLACKJACK, supra note 15, at 16.

137. A study conducted in Atlantic City casinos in 1980 showed that a "basic strategy
player" (basic strategy is the "optimum way for the blackjack player to play his hands if he
is not counting, given a prescribed set of house rules") has a .04% edge over the casinos,
while a conservative card counter has a .25% edge. Id. at 267, 318. Although a .25% (i.e. one
quarter of one percent) edge might not seem significant at first glance, one must remember
that this calculation does not consider how the counter bets. Since the counter bets heavily
only when the deck is "rich" in high cards, such an edge presents the opportunity to generate a significant amount of money over a period of time. See supra note 135.
138. While card counters pose no criminal threat to the gambling industry, they face
potential physical abuse if they are ejected from the premises. In the recent case of Prinz v.
Greate Bay Casino Corp., 705 F.2d 692 (3d Cir. 1983), a card counter filed false imprisonment and assault claims against a casino, alleging he suffered various injuries because of the
force employed by the casino's security guards. The plaintiff had not been disorderly, nor
did he create a disturbance; he was excluded solely because he was a card counter. Id. at
695. However, the plaintiff's guilty plea to a charge of defiant trespass estopped his claim,
although he asserted that the plea was obtained through duress. Id. at 693-96.
139. 89 N.J. 163, 445 A.2d 370 (1982).
140. See supra notes 15, 35.
141. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 19:47-2.5 (Supp. 1980). The new rule changed the way cards
were shuffled. Uston,.89 N.J. at 166, 445 A.2d at 371-72. Atlantic City casinos deal blackjack
with several decks of cards. A yellow plastic card (known as a "cutting card") is placed near
the bottom of the deck to indicate when the cards must be re-shuffled. The new rule places
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reasonable access to public places."1'42 The court also noted that
the absolute right to ban people from places of amusement has
changed over time.143 This was reflected in its previous decision in
State v. Schmid,14 where it recognized that "the more private
property is devoted to public use, the more it must accommodate
the rights which inhere in individual members of the general public who use that property.'1 45 From this, the Uston court concluded that proprietors "have
a duty not to act in an arbitrary or
1' 46
discriminatory manner.

The court's concern in Uston was to prevent the arbitrary exclusion of patrons. It held proprietors of places of amusement
equally accountable to prospective customers. Uston is directly applicable to racetrack exclusion cases since, aside from casino blacklisting policies, the statutory standards used to exclude each respective patron are similar.1 47
C. Application of Uston to Horse Racing Cases
Uston provides a prime illustration of a proprietor's attempt
to extend gambling regulations beyond their stated purpose. 148
Card counters, for example, do not pose a threat to the integrity of
gambling. For instance, Mr. Uston does "not threaten the security
the yellow card closer to the bottom of the decks of cards, thus enabling the dealer to deal
out more "hands." This generates extra profits for the casino, yet also enables card counters
to more accurately predict when certain cards would appear (the more cards seen narrows
the possibilities of which cards will appear next).
142. Uston, 89 N.J. at 168, 445 A.2d at 372.
143. See, e.g., id. at 171, 445 A.2d at 374.
144. 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed as moot sub noa. Princeton
Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982) (per curiam).
145. Uston, 89 N.J. at 172, 445 A.2d at 374 (quoting Schmid, 84 N.J. at 562, 423 A.2d
at 629).
146. Id. at 173, 445 A.2d at 375.
147. Compare the statute appearing supra note 131 with those appearing supra notes
77, 91, 97, 125.
148. "Although the Commission alone has authority to exclude persons based upon
their methods of playing licensed casino games, that authority has constitutional and statutory limits." Uston, 89 N.J. at 174, 445 A.2d at 375. The Casino Control Act abrogates the
proprietor's common law right to exclude patrons. Id. at 167, 445 A.2d at 372. This statute
can only be changed through a statutory mandate by the Commission. Id. at 162, 174, 445
A.2d at 372, 375. The Commission must, however, assure "fair odds to and maximum participation by casino patrons," N.J. STAT ANN. § 5:12-100(e) (emphasis deleted), and maintain
"public confidence and trust in the credibility and integrity of the regulatory process and of
casino operations." Id. § 5:12-1(6). Uston, 89 N.J. at 174-75, 445 A.2d at 375-76. The exclusion of card counters may serve to diminish this "public confidence." Id.
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of any casino occupant. ' 149 The Uston decision limits statutory
abuse by balancing a patron's right to admission favorably against
a casino proprietor's right to exclusion, and by holding the latter to
a public calling standard. However, this standard is limited to excluded individuals from the general public rather than those with
vocational interests, as the New Jersey Supreme Court subsequently decided in Marzocca v. Ferrone.50
In Marzocca, a horse owner was barred from events at the defendant's racetrack after he removed his horse from a race in order
to qualify for a more lucrative race at a different racetrack. 151 The
defendant claimed that the plaintiff's actions decreased betting for
that race, since a specified number of horses was needed to avert
the cancellation of events or the possibility of running "short
fields. 15 2 The New Jersey Appellate Division of the Superior
Court, applying the Uston standard, stated:
Until very recently private enterprises, even those generally open to the public, were regarded in this State as enjoying the absolute common law right,

here asserted, to arbitrarily exclude or eject any person where such action did
not violate state and federal civil rights laws or constitutional considerations.

Lately, however, a decision by our Supreme Court has severely affected that
common law principle. Uston v. Resorts Int[ernationa]lHotel, Inc. That case

graphically illustrates the court's departure from the apparent reiteration of
the absolute exclusionary rule in Garifine v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club.153
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed on this issue, however, because the plaintiff at the raceway was "not a patron. . . in
the same way that Uston was a patron of the casino.' 1 54 The court
recognized that "[a] close examination of the language in Uston
that concerns the common law right to exclude makes clear that
that decision was not intended to reach beyond concerns for the
general public."' 155 Thus, the Marzocca court did not comment
upon the status of the law in the amusement proprietor/patron
context,5 6 although it did explicitly "limit the common law doc149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
part, 93

89 N.J. at 174, 445 A.2d at 375.
93 N.J. 509, 461 A.2d 1133 (1983).
Id. at 512, 461 A.2d at 1134-35.
Id. at 512, 461 A.2d at 1135.
Marzocca v. Ferrone, 186 N.J. Super. 483, 490, 453 A.2d 228, 231 (1982), rev'd in
N.J. 509, 461 A.2d 1133 (1983).

154. Marzocca, 93 N.J. at 516, 461 A.2d at 1137.

155. Id.
156. Id. Thus, it did not address the issue of whether Garifine should be overruled. Id.
at 512, 461 A.2d at 1134.
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trine [to exclude patrons] by proscribing exclusions that violate
public policy." 157 Accordingly, the court probably left available the
opportunity to extend the Uston balancing-of-rights test for casino
patrons to those excluded from racetracks.
This Comment suggests that the balancing approach used in
Uston-holding casino proprietors to a public calling standard-should be adopted to prevent unreasonable exclusions of
patrons from racetracks and casinos. It also proposes that proprietors must show "cause" for excluding "undesirables" when an excluded person's activity does not explicitly fall within a state statute's definition of an "undesirable." 158 Such a requirement would
serve a dual purpose. First, it would require state legislatures to
draft more precise statutes which explicitly define what the term
"undesirable" means. 159 Second, it would provide proprietors with
clear guidelines for screening patrons. Such clarity is needed because the statutes which presently govern the proprietor's right to
exclude patrons arguably are constitutionally "void for
vagueness."16 0
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES FOR EXCLUDED PATRONS

Racetrack and casino proprietors should be held to a public
calling standard, based upon the close involvement that their enterprises have with the state. 61 Although state action arguments
invariably have failed as a remedy for aggrieved patrons, these arguments have rested solely upon procedural, rather than upon substantive, due process grounds.1 62 If state statutes governing the
banning of "undesirables" can be shown to be constitutionally
"void for vagueness," substantive due process claims might be viable. If this alternative fails, however, 1 3 the Uston balancing ap16 4
proach provides the most viable state-level remedy.
157. Id. at 517, 461 A.2d at 1137.
158. See infra text accompanying notes 196-200 and Model Statute in appendix.
159. See Model Statute in appendix.
160. See infra section HI(B).
161. See infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
162. See Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 65 F.2d 736 (6th Cir.) (patron, excluded as an "undesirable," did not establish a property interest needed for a procedural
due process hearing), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 996 (1980).
163. See infra text accompanying note 185.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 139-47.
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EstablishingState Action as a Remedy for Aggrieved Patrons

In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,165 the United
States Supreme Court set forth a test to determine whether a private enterprise is affected by a state interest. In Burton, a black
man was refused service by a restauranteur-lessee of the Wilmington Parking Authority, an agency of the state of Delaware. The
Court found that state action existed because
[t]he state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with
Eagle [Restaurant] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the
challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to have
been so 'purely private' as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment.16
167
The Court held differently, though, in Moose Lodge v. Irvis,
where a Pennsylvania liquor licensing regulation for a fraternal organization was found not to create a sufficiently "close nexus" between the state's interest and the interest of a black man excluded
from the club to qualify the exclusion as state action. However, it
seems apparent that exclusion from racetracks and casinos compels
a greater degree of state involvement than does exclusion from a
fraternal organization, since the former are business entities open
to the general public, whereas the latter is merely an exclusive private club.
The state action claim in Burton was based upon the fact that
the restaurant from which the patron was denied service was
leased to the owner by the state. 168 Consistent with this analysis,
many racetracks, such as some in New York,1 9 are leased by the
state to proprietors. The New York Jockey Club created a nonprofit racing association, which was given a franchise to operate
New York's three major tracks.170 These thoroughbred tracks have

not been owned privately since 1955.171 This appears to draw the
165. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
166. Id. at 725.

167. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). The Court held that "where the impetus for the discrimination is private, the State must have 'significantly involved itself with invidious discriminations' in order to find 'state action.'" Id. at 173.
168. Burton, 365 U.S. at 715.

169. The New York Racing Association operates three major New York racetracks-Aqueduct, Belmont Park and Saratoga. S. FINK, A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO ENHANCE THOROUGHBRED RACING IN NEW YORK

170. Id. at 1.
171. Id.

1-2 (Mar. 14, 1981).
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state into "a position of interdependence"17 2 with New York racing
activity, and makes it difficult to reconcile such state involvement
with New York's common law right to exclude "undesirables."'' 78
Similarly, casino establishments are in a position of interdependence with the state. For example, casino gambling was legalized in
Atlantic City for the purpose of revitalizing that city.17 4 In addition, it is the stated public policy of Nevada that "[t]he gaming
industry is vitally important to the economy of the state and the
'7 5
general welfare of its inhabitants.'
The decision in Jackson v. MetropolitanEdison Co.,176 however, may serve to substantially limit a state action claim brought
by an excluded patron. The Supreme Court in Jackson refused the
petitioner's claim for state action against a public utility, since
"[t]he mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does
not by itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 7 Merely because an entity has a
monopoly on a public service, it does not necessarily follow that a
Burton-type "symbiotic relationship" with the state exists. 17 8
Thus, although there appears to be a close nexus between the state
and the activities of racetrack and casino proprietors, the courts
would probably be reluctant to uphold a state action claim.
172.
173.

See supra text accompanying note 166.
Presti v. New York Racing Ass'n, 46 A.D.2d 387, 287, 363 N.Y.S.2d 24, 24 (1975).

Cf. ILLINOIS HORSE RACING-A STUDY OF LEGISLATION AND CRIMINAL PRACTICES 102 (1974).

Illinois is the only state which provides state security enforcement at tracks (most tracks
hire private guards). State enforcement is necessary because racetrack managements' security interests differ entirely from those of state authorities: "Management is primarily interested in protecting its physical assets. The racing public's welfare is only considered by
management if there is a concomitant threat to management's financial welfare." Id. at 83.
Such involvement draws racetracks into a position of interdependence with the state of Illinois, which strengthens potential state action arguments.
174. See Rose, supra note 135, at 278 n.174. Atlantic City requires that two percent of

any casino's gross revenue be committed to urban renewal. See Mann, Gambling Rage Out
of Control?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 30, 1983, at 29. An example of the effort to
revitalize Atlantic City is the Casino Control Commission's reluctance to grant Resorts a
renewal of its casino license, since "Resorts hadn't done enough to finance new housing in
Atlantic City." Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1983, at 10, col. 2.
175. NEv. RVv. STAT. § 463.0129(1)(a) (1981).
176. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
177. Id. at 350.
178.

Id. at 351-52.
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"Undesirable" Patron Statutes as Constitutionally "Void for

Vagueness"
Most of the racetrack exclusion cases litigated in federal
courts have dealt with requests for a procedural due process hearing before permanent exclusion from a racetrack.17 9 Since a property interest must be shown for such a hearing, patrons have had
little success in obtaining hearings of this nature. 18 0 An alternative
for aggrieved patrons might be to argue on substantive due process
grounds that the existing statutes are "void for vagueness."' '
The issue of whether a statute is "void for vagueness" arose in
Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville,82 where a vagrancy ordinance "'fail[ed] to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice
that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.' ",13
Similarly, it appears that the statutes which ban "undesirables"
from racetracks and casinos are overbroad and do not provide patrons with "anything like a reasonably clear signal of the shoal waters of criminality." 184 It is extremely difficult to convince the
courts, however, that a state statute should be voided: "The day is
gone when th[e Supreme] Court uses the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory
of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
'1 85
thought."
It is evident that excluded patrons would be afforded little redress in federal court. Their best remedy would be, therefore, the
Uston state-level balancing approach-establish the fact that gambling enterprises are public entities, and then argue for the common law right of access to public places. 188 This New Jersey case
179. See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979) (horse trainer afforded procedural due
process hearing); Jacobson v. New York Racing Ass'n, 33 N.Y.2d 144, 305 N.E.2d 765, 350
N.Y.S.2d 639 (1973) (owner-trainer); Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 607 F.2d
589 (3d Cir. 1979) (trainer and driver), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980).
180. Patrons do not have a property interest in attending races, as a trainer or jockey
might. See supra note 162.
181. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 162 (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).
184. United States v. Matthews, 419 F.2d 1177, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
185. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
186. It should be noted here that a proprietor's activity may fall under a public calling
standard at common law, and not fall under a state action standard with a federal claim.
For example, if state action was not established in the Burton case, the restauranteur could
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could serve as a cornerstone for a reassessment of the statutory
standards applied in jurisdictions which still uphold a proprietor's
common law right to exclude patrons arbitrarily.
CONCLUSION

In light of the public nature of racetracks and casinos, the
common law right to exclude patrons arbitrarily from these establishments should be abrogated. Proprietors of such businesses
should be held to a Uston public calling standard in order to prevent arbitrary or mistaken exclusions. Racetracks and casinos are
distinguishable from other places of amusement, since the state
generally has a greater monetary and social interest in regulating
the former. 18 7 It is beyond the scope of this Comment, however, to
suggest that the public calling standard be applied to all gamblingrelated businesses. This determination possibly could be made by
balancing the private interests of a particular gambling industry
with society's interest in providing access to public places.18 8 In
this way, the public calling standard would not be applied to establishments of private character, as contemplated in Moose Lodge
v. Irvis. 89 Once this determination is made, though, state legislatures must then define with greater precision and clarity which patrons should be considered "undesirable."
The need for liberal statutory reform stems from the prevalent
lack of uniformity in the courts' interpretation of what constitutes
an "undesirable" person. In order to construct a statute affording
patrons protection against arbitrary discrimination, a balance must
be made between a patron's rights and public policy demands. It
must not, therefore, effectively allow corruptive elements into the
gambling industry. 190 This Comment proposes such a statute in an
effort to reconcile the tension between conflicting demands. 191 The
public policy concerns expressed in the proposed statute reflect the
have been held to a common law public calling standard at state law, since innkeepers are
held to such a standard. See Madden, 296 N.Y. at 253, 72 N.E.2d at 698.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
188. Jai alai establishments, for example, obviously would be subject to stricter state
regulations (based on, for instance, more money generated to the state), than would the
local "bingo parlor" (although "some bingo players have devised elaborate cheating
schemes"). GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 22, at 164.
189. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). See supra text accompanying note 167.
190. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
191. See Model Statute in appendix.
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concerns presented by provisions in the various casino statutes
previously discussed.192 These provisions include the recognition
that gambling is vitally important to a state's economy; 19 3 that
"public confidence" can only be maintained through strict regulation;1 94 and that patrons must be afforded "fair odds" and "maximum participation.119

5

In addition, however, the gambling indus-

try should be held explicitly to a public standard,1 96 so that
arbitrary exclusions will be avoided.
Several factors should also be considered in defining the term
"undesirable." First, some state statutes only require that a "belief' of a patron's "undesirable" traits be shown before exclusion.197 Licensees should be required to have "knowledge" of these

traits in order to avoid mistaken exclusions. Second, contrary to
the New York statute, 198 a person should not be excluded for
merely associating with an "undesirable," unless it is shown that
his actions conformed with the actions of the "undesirable." Finally, if a person is excluded based upon a prior criminal act, consideration should be given to how much time has passed since the
crime was committed.1 99 Such an inquiry could be made at a hearing conducted by the state's racing or casino commission immediately after exclusion. 00
The public policy behind excluding "undesirables" rests with
the desire to cleanse the gambling industry of crime and corruption. This notion must be factored in when considering liberal statutory reforms. Such notions must be questioned, however, when
the potential for constitutional violations exists through the courts'
192.

See supra section H(B).

193. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (referring to NEv. REv. STAT.

§

463.0129(l)(a) (1981)).
194. NEv. Rav. STAT. § 463.0129(1)(c) (1981).
195. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-100(e) (West Supp. 1983-1984).
196. See supra note 2.
197. See, e.g., N.J. ADmiN. CODE tit. 13, § 13.70-1.17 (1969) (patrons may be excluded if

they are "believed" to be bookmakers).
198. See the New York statute, supra note 125, at subsection (e).
199. Other evidence of "prior bad acts" should be factored into the decision as well. See
supra text accompanying notes 95-101.
200. A preliminary injunction preventing exclusion before such a hearing probably

would not be granted, absent some property interest. See, e.g., Rodic v. Thistledown Racing
Club, Inc., 65 F.2d 736 (6th Cir.) (patron, excluded as an "undesirable," did not establish a
property interest needed for a procedural due process hearing), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 996

(1980).
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illusory perception that the racetrack and casino gambling industries are inherently private entities.

APPENDIX

Model Statute
1. Title. Exclusion of Patrons From Racetracks and Casinos.
2. Purpose. The purpose of this Act is to protect the vital
interests of the gambling industry by safeguarding it from corruptive elements in society.
3. Policy concerning gambling. The public policy of this
state is that:
a) the gaming industry is vitally important to the economic
growth of the state and to the general welfare of its inhabitants;
b) public confidence can only be maintained in the industry
through strict regulation of all people associated with the industry;
c) in no way will the regulation suggested in subsection 3(b)
of this Act diminish the fair odds to and maximum participation
by gambling patrons; and
d) the racetrack and casino gambling industries, inasmuch as
they are heavily regulated by this state (and in recognition of subsection 3(a) of this Act), are public entities.
4. Exclusion of patrons.A proprietor may exclude, subject to
sections 5 and 6 of this Act, all undesirable people from his racetrack or casino, whose past or present actions are deemed in their
judgment to be detrimental to the best interests of the gambling
industry.
5. Undesirable person defined. An undesirable person is a
prospective or present patron who: a) is known to be involved in
illegal wagering or activity, is a bookmaker or tout 01 at a racetrack, or is in violation of the gaming laws of any state; or b) has
been convicted of a felony or a crime involving illegal gambling,
gambling fraud, or moral turpitude; or c) acts in an affirmative
manner to create or perpetuate a disturbance or action which is
detrimental to the best interests of the gambling industry.
201.

For a definition of "tout," see N.Y. ADmN. CODE tit. 9, § 4119.8(c), supra note 125,

at subsection (b).
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6. Limits on exclusion. Racetrack and casino proprietors may
not exclude a patron:
a) for merely associating with an undesirable, unless the patron acts in a way consistent with subsection 5(c) of this Act; or
b) permanently (through a court injunction), based solely on
a criminal conviction or illegal act, if the connection between such
acts and the issue of exclusion is sufficiently attenuated by time (at
least 10 years); or
c) arbitrarily or without good cause; or
d) for reasons of race, color, national origin, sex or religion.
PERRY

Z. BINDER

